Environmental conflicts arise as a consequence of actions preventing or compelling some outcome at the resistance to the actions. More specifically, they are caused by anthropogenic activities that strain and damage the environment. Modelling environmental conflict is one of the fundamental ways providing means of solving them. In order to understand and model them, it is critical to identify potential and/or existing conflict causes (structural causes or proximate causes), as well as possible factors contributing to peace. In this paper, the dynamic time varying model for predicting environmental conflict is developed using Bayesian theory. The initial (state) conditions which play a significant role in the success of conflict resolution are estimated through a logistic probability model.
Introduction
Environmental or any other conflicts arise due to a condition in which actions of one person prevent or compel some outcome at the resistance of the other. Quite often this may result in "two or more competing, often incompatible, responses to same event" Omwenga and Mwita (2010) . In the recent past, formal models and quantitative analysis have come a long way towards explaining how strategic actors bargain in a variety of conflict settings. For instance, in the political setting or international relations, bargaining plays a central role in understanding and solving any conflict and thus, the mastery of the concept of bargaining is very important; Banks (1990) , Huth and Allee (2002) , London (2002) , Powell(1987 Powell( , 1996 .
To understand the basics of the logic of bargaining in the face of conflicting interests, Game Theory has played a key role. For instance, political scientist have employed for
instance, bargaining models to analyze effects of open and closed rules on the distributive politics of legislative appropriation to the study of war initiation and termination; Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , Mansfield et al. (2000) .
Most environmental based conflicts are triggered by the differences in opinions and interpretation of ideas. It is therefore important that these differences are understood in terms of their magnitude in a conflict and taken care of before any bargaining can commence. This gives the opinion of each party an unbiased attention, since they fairly assign time/attention based on their contribution in a conflict.
Further, theoretical studies of the bargaining problem have pointed to the importance of asymmetric information and the "reservation values" (control variables) of players in distributional conflicts. In general, it is important to understand the effects of control variables on the bargaining process. Conflict situations can be described by statistical and numerical models of the system dynamics. These models rely on fundamental or empirical models that are frequently described by systems of ordinary differential equations (ODEs), Signorino (1999 Signorino ( , 2000 . The models can be used to predict the future behaviour/dynamics of any environmental based conflict, provided that the initial states of the conflict are known or can be estimated. As the main causes and factors contributing to conflict and to peace are identified, it is important to acknowledge that conflicts are multi-dimensional and multicausal phenomena -that there is no single cause of conflict. It is also essential to establish linkages and synergies between causes and factors, in order to identify potential areas for intervention and further prioritise them.
Various accounts on the modelling of a conflict from the perspective of social welfare theory and social choice theory have been given by Gordon (2007) . Complete data defining all of the states of a conflict system at a specific time are, however, rarely available.
For instance, in a conflict, for instance, there are some underlying issues that can be described to be private and as such may not be available. This challenge can however, be handled using missing data analysis techniques, Rubin (1996) , Harzog and Rubin (1993) .
Moreover, both the models and the available initial data contain inaccuracies and random noise that can lead to significant differences between the predicted states of the system and the actual states of the system. In such a case, observations of the system over time can be incorporated into the model equations to derive improved estimates of the states and also to provide information about the uncertainty in the estimates.
In this paper, we present a model for conflict prediction in a dynamic state based on the state dynamics as represented by the ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Critical to the conflict prediction model are the initial conditions estimation. These initial conditions are estimated from the exponential state dynamic models by solving the model using Laplace transformation.
Exponential model
The dynamics in this case can be modelled by
where  is representative for exponential growth rate of a conflict and y is a reducing factor depending on the prevailing environmental factors.
But due to the in-deterministic nature of the environmental factors, y might remain missing. To overcome this, we propose a logistic model that takes care of the environmental dynamics given by,
where t y is the threshold values for conflict occurrence.
To solve (2), we rewrite the equation into the 
Equation (5) is the first order linear ODE. Since we have a varying parameter , we apply Laplace transformation to solve equation (5), which is rewritten as;
The solution to (6) is given by;
Since,
, we can write the general solution equation (7) 
Conflict environment dynamics
In general, if the desired state is specified for all the time, the requirements for the existence of a control variable (initial condition) that will generate the desired outcome   f  , are very stringent. A less ambitious but more realistic goal is to require only a partial specification of the state variables. One such partial specification is forcing the state of a given system to attain a specified value at some finite time in the future.
That is, given an initial time, 0 t an initial Omwenga et al (2010) . These new outcomes which represent the available beliefs can be estimated and updated using the Baye"s rule given by;
where . This presents equilibrium cutpoint strategy for the second party given by:
Since 2  is private, the first party does not observe it and therefore observability concept in a conflict is not compromised, but must assess the probability that the second party will accept or reject his demand using the relation;
Considering the optimization problem for the first party, given the second party"s strategy (16), then the expected utility for the first party is:
where Q * is the upper bound of the contested prize.
By the first order condition (F.O.C) and the log-concavity of 2  f , the first party's optimal demand is the unique y* that implicitly solves, 
However, * * 0 Q y   and sometimes y * will be outside the feasible set. We can then show that an end-point (0 or Q * ) is optimal and in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), the first party will have the strategy: 
where z=Q Using equation (20), the Likelihood,
which is a measure of the probability of seeing particular realization of the state , can be estimated as
According to Omwenga and Mwita (2010) The application of the model to predict occurrence of a conflict starts by the estimation of initial conditions in a conflict situation.
Modelling the initial conditions in this situation
can be compared to the modelling of the risk related to the previous conflict Clementine, Dirk and Francois (2008) . It is believed that environment that have experienced a conflict are more prone to another conflict in the future and thus their risk levels are high. This paper proposes a model that estimates the initial conditions which can act as the pointer to the current risk levels using the past and current state control variables. The estimates of the initial conditions can be used to make 
And the prior belief ) ( P which reflects on the existing knowledge about the conflict together with information on how the conflict evolve can be obtained as: (25) This estimate follows a Bernoulli distribution given by 
Conclusion
In sections 3.0, we have provided a mechanism for the restrictions on the choices for the parties to the conflict and this has enabled us to express the outcomes as probability (weighted) of individual ideals. The restriction has the advantage of encapsulating most of the inherent optimality conditions in the Game theory.
Through this approach we are able to estimate the likelihood of an occurrence of a conflict and make a prediction using dynamic models.
